Opportunistic and deliberate disinflation under imperfect credibility
Antulio N. Bomfim and
Glenn Rudebusch ()
No 97-07, Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
On strategy for disinflation prescribes a deliberate path towards low inflation. A contrasting opportunistic approach eschews deliberate action and instead waits for unforeseen shocks to reduce inflation. This paper compares the ability of these two approaches to achieve disinflation-and at what cost. We analyze these issues using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model, which allows alternative assumptions to be made about expectations held by agents in the economy; hence, the credibility of the central bank can be considered in assessing the cost of deliberate and opportunistic disinflation.
Keywords: Inflation (Finance); Monetary policy; Banks and banking, Central; Monetary policy - United States (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Opportunistic and Deliberate Disinflation under Imperfect Credibility (2000)
Working Paper: Opportunistic and deliberate disinflation under imperfect credibility (1998)
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