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The evolution of \\"too-big-to-fail\\" policy in Japan: evidence from market equity values

Mark Spiegel () and Nobuyoshi Yamori ()

No 00-01, Pacific Basin Working Paper Series from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

Abstract: This paper examines the evidence in bank equity markets concerning bank regulatory policies in Japan over the turbulent 1995-1998 period. We find that investors grouped banks according to regulatory status in assessing whether a bank was currently treated as \\"too-big-to-fail.\\" when a failure of a bank of certain regulatory status was announced, excess returns on other banks of that regulatory status and below displayed heightened sensitivity to adverse news. This suggests that investors updated their beliefs about which classes of banks were protected by too-big-to-fail policies over the course of the sample. The pattern that emerges suggests that government officials pursued a policy of \\"regulatory triage,\\" where initially Credit Cooperatives, then Second Regional banks, then First Regional banks, and finally City banks were allowed to fail.

Keywords: Banks and banking - Japan; Bank failures; Bank supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000, Revised 2000
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-fmk
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