International evidence on government support and risk taking in the banking sector

Luis Brandao-Marques, Ricardo Correa and Horacio Sapriza
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Luis Brandao Marques

No 1086, International Finance Discussion Papers from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: Government support to banks through the provision of explicit or implicit guarantees affects the willingness of banks to take on risk by reducing market discipline or by increasing charter value. We use an international sample of rated banks and find that government support is associated with more risk taking by banks, especially prior and during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. We also find that restricting banks? range of activities ameliorates the link between government support and bank risk taking. We conclude that strengthening market discipline by reducing bank complexity is needed to address this moral hazard problem.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-cse, nep-lam, nep-ltv, nep-neu and nep-rmg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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Related works:
Working Paper: International Evidence on Government Support and Risk Taking in the Banking Sector (2013)
Working Paper: International Evidence on Government Support and Risk-Taking in the Banking Sector (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgif:1086

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