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Selective Sovereign Defaults

Aitor Erce () and Enrico Mallucci ()

No 1239, International Finance Discussion Papers from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: Governments issue debt both domestically and abroad. This heterogeneity introduces the possibility for governments to operate selective defaults that discriminate across investors. Using a novel dataset on the legal jurisdiction of sovereign defaults that distinguishes between defaults under domestic law and default under foreign law, we show that selectiveness is the norm and that imports, credit, and output dynamics are different around different types of default. Domestic defaults are associated with contractions of credit and are more likely in countries with smaller credit markets. In turn, external defaults, are associated with a sharp contraction of imports and are more likely in countries with depressed import markets. Based on these regularities, we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that we calibrate to Argentina. We show that the model replicates well the behavior of the Argentinean economy and rationalizes these empirical findings.

Keywords: Sovereign Default; Selective Defaults; Domestic Debt; External Debt; Credit; Imports (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 F41 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-opm
Date: 2018-11
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Working Paper: Selective sovereign defaults (2012) Downloads
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DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2018.1239

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