Bank bailouts, interventions, and moral hazard

Lammertjan Dam and Michael Koetter

No 1131, Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Keywords: Bank failures; Troubled Asset Relief Program; Financial institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 299-326
Date: 2011
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Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (2011: 47th) ; Implementing Dodd-Frank : Progress and Recommendations for the Future

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