Bank bailouts, interventions, and moral hazard
Lammertjan Dam and
No 1131, Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Keywords: Bank failures; Troubled Asset Relief Program; Financial institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (2011: 47th) ; Implementing Dodd-Frank : Progress and Recommendations for the Future
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Working Paper: Bank bailouts, interventions, and moral hazard (2011)
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