Incentive compatibility and technical progress: about pre-commitment and value at risk

Charles A. E. Goodhart and Philipp Hartman

No 546, Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Keywords: Bank supervision; Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 184-200
Date: 1997
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Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (1997 : 33rd) ; Technology : //www.policy.implications.for.the.future.of.financial.services/com.

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