The demise of double liability as an optimal contract for large-bank stockholders

Edward Kane and Berry Wilson

No 556, Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Keywords: Stockholders; Bank stocks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 374-401
Date: 1997
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Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (1997 : 33rd) ; Technology : //www.policy.implications.for.the.future.of.financial.services/com.

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Working Paper: The Demise of Double Liability as an Optimal Contract for Large-Bank Stockholders (1996)
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