Whether and why banks are opaque

Donald Morgan

No 636, Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Keywords: Bank loans; Bank management; Bank supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54-71
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (1999 : 35th) ; Global financial crisis : implications for banking and regulation

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