Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulations infer from event-study evidence?
Edward Kane ()
No 675, Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Keywords: Bank mergers; Bank examination; Bank supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (2000 : 36th) ; The changing financial industry structure and regulation : bridging states, countries, and industries
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Journal Article: Incentives for banking megamergers: what motives might regulators infer from event-study evidence? (2000)
Journal Article: Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence? (2000)
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