Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence from subordinated debt issues

Andrea Sironi ()

No 712, Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Keywords: Bank management; Banks and banking - Europe; Banking market; Debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 366-384
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (2001 : 37th) ; The financial net: costs, benefits, and implications for regulation

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Journal Article: Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues (2003)
Working Paper: Testing for market discipline in the European banking industry: evidence from subordinated debt issues (2000)
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