Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions

Charles Kahn and Andrew Winton

No 808, Proceedings from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Keywords: Bank assets; Debt; Financial institutions; Risk management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 129-149
Date: 2002
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Published in Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (2002 : 38th) ; Financial market behavior and appropriate regulation over the business cycle

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