The social discount rate

Andrew Caplin and John Leahy

No 137, Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: In welfare theory it is standard to pick the consumption stream that maximizes the welfare of the representative agent. We argue against this position, and show that a benevolent social planner will generally place a greater weight on future consumption than does the representative agent.

Keywords: Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Social Discount Rate (2004)
Working Paper: The Social Discount Rate (2000)
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