Eliciting traders' knowledge in \\"frictionless\\" asset market

Edward Green

No 144, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: Intuitively, a patient trader should be able to make his trading partners compete to reveal whatever information is relevant to their transactions with him. This possibility is examined in the context of a model resembling that of Gale (1986). The main result is that, under assumptions having to do with asset structure and spanning, incentive-compatible elicitation of trading partners? knowledge is feasible.

Keywords: Game; theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:144

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