Two-sided search

Kenneth Burdett and Randall Wright

No 169, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: We integrate search theory into an equilibrium framework in a new way and argue that the result is a simple but powerful tool for understanding many issues related to bilateral matching. We assume for much of what we do that utility is less than perfectly transferable. This turns out to generate multiple equilibria that do not arise in a standard model, with transferable utility, unless one adds increasing returns. We also provide simple conditions for uniqueness that apply to models with or without transferable utility or increasing returns. Examples, applications, and extensions are discussed.

Keywords: Labor market; Econometric models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Two-Sided Search with Nontransferable Utility (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:169

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