Default, settlement, and signalling: lending resumption in a reputational model of sovereign debt

Harold Cole, James Dow and William B. English

No 180, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: This paper develops a simple model of sovereign debt in which defaulting nations are excluded from capital markets and regain access by making partial repayments. This is consistent with the historical evidence that defaulting countries return to international loan markets soon after a settlement, but after varying periods of exclusion.

Keywords: Debts; External (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Default, Settlement, and Signalling: Lending Resumption in a Reputational Model of Sovereign Debt (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:180

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