Social insurance and taxation under sequential majority voting and utilitarian regimes

S. Aiyagari and Dan Peled ()

No 197, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: It is often argued that with a positively skewed income distribution (median less than mean) majority voting would result in higher tax rates than maximizing average welfare and, hence, lower aggregate savings. We reexamine this view in a capital accumulation model, in which distorting redistributive taxes provide insurance against idiosyncratic shocks and income distributions evolve endogenously. We find small differences of either sign between the tax rates set by a majority voting and a utilitarian government, for reasonable parametric specifications, despite the fact that model simulations produce positively skewed distributions of total income across agents.

Keywords: Income distribution; Taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Journal Article: Social insurance and taxation under sequential majority voting and utilitarian regimes (1995)
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