On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment

Christopher Phelan

No 268, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: This paper presents a government debt game with the property that if the timing of debt auctions within a period is sufficiently unfettered, the set of equilibrium outcome paths of real economic variables given the government has access to a rich debt structure is identical to the set of equilibrium outcome paths given the government can issue only one-period debt.

Keywords: Debt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: On the irrelevance of the maturity structure of government debt without commitment (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:268

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