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Risky collateral and deposit insurance

Narayana Kocherlakota ()

No 274, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: This paper provides a new rationalization for deposit insurance and systemic disintermediations. I consider an environment in which borrowers face no penalty for failing to repay obligations except the loss of their collateral. I assume that this collateral has aggregate risk. For a subset of the exogenous parameters, I demonstrate that an optimal arrangement features deposit insurance. For a strictly smaller set of parameters, it is optimal in some states of the world to have systemic disintermediation and concomitant falls in real output.

Keywords: Deposit insurance; Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Journal Article: Risky Collateral and Deposit Insurance (2001) Downloads
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