Public trust and government betrayal

Christopher Phelan

No 283, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: This paper presents a simple model of government reputation which captures two characteristics of policy outcomes in less developed countries: governments which betray public trust do so erratically, and, after a betrayal, public trust is regained only gradually.

Keywords: Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Public trust and government betrayal (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:283

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