The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy

Susan Athey, Andrew Atkeson and Patrick Kehoe

No 326, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: How much discretion should the monetary authority have in setting its policy? This question is analyzed in an economy with an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the randomly fluctuating state of the economy. The monetary authority has private information about that state. In the model, well-designed rules trade off society?s desire to give the monetary authority discretion to react to its private information against society?s need to guard against the time inconsistency problem arising from the temptation to stimulate the economy with unexpected inflation. Although this dynamic mechanism design problem seems complex, society can implement the optimal policy simply by legislating an inflation cap that specifies the highest allowable inflation rate. The more severe the time inconsistency problem and the less important is private information, the smaller is the optimal degree of discretion. As either the time inconsistency problem becomes sufficiently severe or private information becomes sufficiently unimportant, the optimal degree of discretion is none.

Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Econometrica (Vol. 73, No. 5, September 2005, pp. 1431-1475)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr326.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy (2005)
Working Paper: The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy (2004)
Working Paper: The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy (2004)
Working Paper: The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy (2003)
Working Paper: The optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:326

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kate Hansel ().