The intergenerational state: education and pensions
Michele Boldrin and
Ana Montes ()
No 336, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Abstract:
When credit markets to finance investment in human capital are missing, the competitive equilibrium allocation is inefficient. When generations overlap, this failure can be mitigated by properly designed social arrangements. We show that public financing of education and public pensions can be designed to implement an intergenerational transfer scheme supporting the complete market allocation. Neither the public financing of education nor the pension scheme we consider resemble standard ones. In our mechanism, via the public education system, the young borrow from the middle aged to invest in human capital. They pay back the debt via a social security tax, the proceedings of which finance pension payments. When the complete market allocation is achieved, the rate of return implicit in this borrowing-lending scheme should equal the market rate of return.
Keywords: Social; security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
Published in Review of Economic Studies> (Vol. 72, No. 3, July 2005, pp. 651-664)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr336.pdf Full Text (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: The Intergenerational State Education and Pensions (2005) 
Working Paper: The Intergenerational State: Education and Pensions (2002) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:336
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kate Hansel ().