A model of long-term contracts

John Bryant

No 47, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: Long-term contracts are explained as equilibrium strategies of supergames. In the specific coherent general equilibrium model provided, limited mobility of labor, in the form of a fixed cost of moving, generates long-term contracts.

Date: 1980
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