Minimax-Nash

John Bryant

No 52, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: An alternative solution concept is recommended for noncooperative games with multiple equilibra. Players maximize security level in a contracted game. Examples in economics are given in which this solution concept yields a unique solution: a fiat money model, the capital overaccumulation problem, and multiple rational expectations equilibria generally.

Date: 1979
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