A generalized equilibrium solution for game theory

John Bryant

No 57, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: Iterated contraction by dominance produces a generalized equilibrium. This solution to game theory is motivated, generated, analyzed, and compared to Nash equilibrium. One implication drawn is that a realized event in a social situation need not be uniquely determined by simple individual choices, even though the preference orderings implying those choices are the appropriate primitive.

Date: 1981
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