Parametric properties of tax effort revenue sharing

Michael Stutzer

No 66, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: Some Revenue Sharing programs, including the Federal government?s General Revenue Sharing program, reward higher tax effort with larger aid payments. A natural, game-theoretic generalization of the standard consumer demand based theory of grants-in-aid is used to examine the impacts such tax effort provisions have on the recipient government?s tax effort, spending levels, and welfare. Nonlinear simulation is used to provide rough quantitative estimates of the impacts General Revenue Sharing had in 1972.

Date: 1981
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