Correspondence principles for concave orthogonal games

Michael Stutzer

No 90, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: Silberberg [6] and Pauwels [2] have produced and clarified seminal results in the comparative statics of single-agent classical optimization problems. This paper extends Pauwels? method to derive analogous results for stable Nath equilibria in a subclass of the widely used class of concave orthogonal games defined by Rosen [3]. Application of these results to cost curve shifts in the asymmetric Cournot oligopoly immediately uncovers apparently new comparative statics results.

Date: 1984
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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