A Ramsey Theory of Financial Distortions

Marco Bassetto and Wei Cui

No 643, Staff Report from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: The return on government debt is lower than that of asset with similar payoffs. We study optimal debt management and taxation when the government cannot directly redistribute towards the agents in need of liquidity but otherwise has access to a complete set of linear tax instruments. Optimal government debt provision calls for gradually closing the wedge between the returns as much as possible, but tax policy may work as a countervailing force: as long as financial frictions bind, it can be optimal to tax capital even if this magnifies the discrepancy in returns.

Keywords: Capital tax; Financing constraints; Asset liquidity; Optimal level of government debt; Low interest rates (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 E44 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-02-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Ramsey Theory of Financial Distortions (2024)
Working Paper: A Ramsey Theory of Financial Distortions (2021)
Working Paper: A Ramsey theory of financial distortions (2021)
Working Paper: A Ramsey Theory of Financial Distortions (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmsr:95726

DOI: 10.21034/sr.643

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