Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: with an application to deposit insurance

Bruce Smith and Cheng Wang

No 574, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: We consider the problem of an insurer who enters into a repeated relationship with a set of risk averse agents in the presence of ex post verification costs. The insurer wishes to minimize the expected cost of providing these agents a certain expected utility level. We characterize the optimal contract between the insurer and the insured agents. We then apply the analysis to the provision of deposit insurance. Our results suggest - in a deposit insurance context - that it may be optimal to utilize the discount window early on, and to make deposit insurance payments only later, or not at all.

Keywords: Insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Related works:
Journal Article: Repeated insurance relationships in a costly state verification model: With an application to deposit insurance (1998)
Working Paper: Repeated Insurance Relationships in a Costly State Verification Model: With an Application to Deposit Insurance (1998)
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