The economics of split-ticket voting in representative democracies

Varadarajan Chari, Larry Jones and Ramon Marimon

No 582, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: In U.S. elections, voters often vote for candidates from different parties for president and Congress. Voters also express dissatisfaction with the performance of Congress as a whole and satisfaction with their own representative. We develop a model of split-ticket voting in which government spending is financed by uniform taxes but the benefits from this spending are concentrated. While the model generates split-ticket voting, overall spending is too high only if the president?s powers are limited. Overall spending is too high in a parliamentary system, and our model can be used as the basis of an argument for term limits.

Keywords: Government; spending; policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (94)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Economics of Split-Ticket Voting in Representative Democracies (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmwp:582

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