A simple model of bank employee compensation

Christopher Phelan

No 676, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

Abstract: This paper considers the question, Does the limited liability associated with banking make it necessary for a government to regulate bank employee compensation? It attempts to shed light on this question by considering a mechanism design framework.

Date: 2009
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http://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/WP/WP676.pdf

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmwp:676

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