Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises
Javier Bianchi and
Jorge Mondragon
No 755, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Abstract:
This paper shows that the inability to use monetary policy for macroeconomic stabilization leaves a government more vulnerable to a rollover crisis. We study a sovereign default model with self-fulfilling rollover crises, foreign currency debt, and nominal rigidities. When the government lacks monetary autonomy, lenders anticipate that the government will face a severe recession in the event of a liquidity crisis, and are therefore more prone to run on government bonds. By contrast, a government with monetary autonomy can stabilize the economy and can easily remain immune to a rollover crisis. In a quantitative application, we find that the lack of monetary autonomy played a central role in making the Eurozone vulnerable to a rollover crisis. A lender of last resort can help ease the costs from giving up monetary independence.
Keywords: Sovereign debt crises; Rollover risk; monetary unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E4 E5 F34 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2018-12-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac, nep-mon and nep-opm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/wp/wp755.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises (2022)
Working Paper: Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises (2019)
Working Paper: Monetary Independence and Rollover Crises (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedmwp:755
DOI: 10.21034/wp.755
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kate Hansel ().