The Minimum Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Stabilize Money Market Funds

Marco Cipriani, Michael Holscher, Antoine Martin and Patrick E. McCabe
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Patrick E. McCabe: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/patrick-e-mccabe.htm

No 20121015, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: In a June post, we explained why the design of money market funds (MMFs) makes them prone to runs and thereby contributes to financial instability. Today, we outline a proposal for strengthening MMFs that we?ve put forward in a recent New York Fed staff report. The proposal aims to reduce, and possibly eliminate, the incentive for investors to run from a troubled fund, while retaining the defining features of money market funds that make them popular financial products. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, in a recent letter to the Financial Stability Oversight Council, requested that it consider an idea similar to what we described in our staff report as one of several potential options for reforming MMFs to address their structural vulnerabilities.

Keywords: Runs; Money Market Funds; Minimum Balance at Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mon
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