A “Reference Price Auction” to Buy or Sell Different Assets Simultaneously

Olivier Armantier

No 20130102, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: In finance, auctions are often conducted to buy or sell simultaneously various assets with very different characteristics. These auctions raise a number of challenges that cannot always be addressed with standard auction designs. In this post, I discuss an alternative design—the “reference price auction”—and present evidence that it may dominate other methods often implemented in practice.

Keywords: auction design; procurement auctions; laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-01-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednls:86849

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