Dealers’ Positions and the Auction Cycle

Michael Fleming and Collin Jones

No 20151014, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: The aftermath of the financial crisis and changes in technology and regulation have spurred a spirited discussion of dealers? evolving role in financial markets. One such role is to buy securities at auction and sell them off to investors over time. We assess this function using data on primary dealers? positions in benchmark Treasury securities, released by the New York Fed since April 2013 and described in this earlier Liberty Street Economics post.

Keywords: auctions; Treasury securities; positions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G1 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-14
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