The Economics of Bank Supervision: So Much to Do, So Little Time

Thomas Eisenbach, David Lucca and Robert Townsend

No 20160412, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: While bank regulation and supervision are the two main components of banking policy, the difference between them is often overlooked and the details of supervision can appear shrouded in secrecy. In this post, which is based on a recent staff report, we provide a framework for thinking about supervision and its relation to regulation. We then use data on supervisory efforts of Federal Reserve bank examiners to describe how supervisory efforts vary by bank size and risk, and to measure key trade-offs in allocating resources.

Keywords: Bank Supervision; Monitoring; Bank Regulation; Time Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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