The Cost and Duration of Excess Funding Capacity in Tri-Party Repo

Adam Copeland, Ira Selig and Noah Zinsmeister

No 20171004, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: In a previous post, we showed that dealers sometimes enter into tri-party repo contracts to acquire excess funding capacity, and that this strategy is most prevalent for the agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and equity asset classes. In this post, we examine the maturity of the repos used to pursue this strategy and estimate the associated costs. We find that repos that generate excess funding capacity for equities and corporate debt have longer maturities than the average repo involving either of these asset classes. Furthermore, the premiums dealers pay to maintain excess funding capacity can be substantial, particularly for equities.

Keywords: funding; tri-party repos (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednls:87216

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