Do the Employed Get Better Job Offers?

Jason Faberman (), Thomas Haasl, Andreas Mueller and Aysegul Sahin
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Giorgio Topa

No 20180404, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: In a previous post, we examined the job search behavior of workers, both on the job and while unemployed. We found that job seeking is pervasive among employed workers, and that searching while employed is more effective than searching while unemployed in producing employer contacts and job offers. But how do the offers received through “on the job” searches compare to those received while unemployed? What do their wages look like, how do they compare in terms of nonwage benefits, and how much bargaining between employers and job applicants is involved? In this post, we shed some light on how job offers may vary depending on the employment status of the job seeker.

Keywords: job offers; employed; unemployed; nonemployed; labor; benefits; bargaining; wages; job seekers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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