The Official Sector’s Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic and Moral Hazard
Anna Kovner and
Antoine Martin ()
No 20200924, Liberty Street Economics from Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Any time the Federal Reserve or the official sector more broadly provides support to the economy during a crisis, the intervention raises concerns related to moral hazard. Moral hazard can occur when market participants do not bear the negative consequences of the risks they take. This lack of consequences can encourage even greater risks, due to the expectation of future government help. In this post, we consider the potential for moral hazard stemming from the official sector’s response to the coronavirus pandemic and explain why moral hazard concerns were likely more severe in 2008.
Keywords: pandemic; COVID-19; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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