Endogenous deposit dollarization

Christian Broda and Eduardo Levy Yeyati

No 160, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: This paper explores sources of deposit dollarization unrelated to standard moral hazard arguments. We develop a model in which banks choose the optimal currency composition of their liabilities. We argue that the equal treatment of peso and dollar claims in the event of bank default can induce banks to attract dollar deposits above the socially desirable level. The distortion arises because dollar deposits are the only source of default risk in the model, but dollar depositors share the burden of the default with peso depositors. The incentive to dollarize is reinforced by common banking system safety nets such as deposit and bank insurance. Our findings suggest that regulators in bi-currency economies would potentially benefit by departing from the currency-blind benchmark and differentiating among currencies in a way that prevents undesirable currency mismatches.

Keywords: Bank deposits; Foreign exchange; Currency convertibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr160.html (text/html)
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr160.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Deposit Dollarization (2006)
Working Paper: Endogenous Deposit Dollarization (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednsr:160

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gabriella Bucciarelli ().