Settlement delays in the money market
Leonardo Bartolini,
R. Spence Hilton and
James McAndrews
No 319, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Abstract:
We track 38,000 money market trades from execution to delivery and return to provide a first empirical analysis of settlement delays in financial markets. In line with predictions from recent models showing that financial claims are settled strategically, we document a tendency by lenders to delay delivery of loaned funds until the afternoon hours. We find that banks follow a simple strategy to manage the risk of account overdrafts - delaying the settlement of large payments relative to that of small payments. More sophisticated strategies, such as increasing settlement delays when own liquid balances are low and when dealing with small trading partners, play a marginal role. We also find evidence of strategic delay in the return of borrowed funds, although we can explain a smaller fraction of the dispersion in delays in the return than in the delivery leg of money market lending.
Keywords: Banks and banking; Money market; Electronic funds transfers; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba
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Journal Article: Settlement delays in the money market (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednsr:319
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