Payment size, negative equity, and mortgage default
Andreas Fuster () and
No 582, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Surprisingly little is known about the importance of mortgage payment size for default, as efforts to measure the treatment effect of rate increases or loan modifications are confounded by borrower selection. We study a sample of hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages that have experienced substantial rate reductions over the past years and are largely immune to these selection concerns. We find that payment size has an economically large effect on repayment behavior; for instance, cutting the required payment in half reduces the delinquency hazard by about 55 percent. Importantly, the link between payment size and delinquency holds even for borrowers who are significantly underwater on their mortgages. These findings shed light on the driving forces behind default behavior and have important implications for public policy.
Keywords: adjustable-rate mortgages; delinquency; mortgage finance; Alt-A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E43 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 61 pages
Date: 2012, Revised 2015-01-01
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Journal Article: Payment Size, Negative Equity, and Mortgage Default (2017)
Working Paper: Payment Size, Negative Equity, and Mortgage Default (2013)
Working Paper: Payment size, negative equity, and mortgage default (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fednsr:582
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