Financial stability policies for shadow banking

Tobias Adrian

No 664, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: This paper explores financial stability policies for the shadow banking system. I tie policy options to economic mechanisms for shadow banking that have been documented in the literature. I then illustrate the role of shadow bank policies using three examples: agency mortgage real estate investment trusts, leveraged lending, and captive reinsurance affiliates. For each example, the economic mechanisms are explained, the potential risks emanating from the activities are described, and policy options to mitigate such risks are listed. The overarching theme of the analysis is that any policy prescription for the shadow banking system is highly specific to the particular activity.

Keywords: shadow bank policies; systemic risk; financial intermediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E44 G00 G01 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Financial Stability Policies for Shadow Banking (2015)
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