Information Management in Times of Crisis

Haelim Anderson () and Adam Copeland
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Haelim Anderson: https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/bios/anderson.html

No 907, Staff Reports from Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Abstract: How does information management and control affect bank stability? Following a national bank holiday in 1933, New York state bank regulators suspended the publication of balance sheets of state-charter banks for two years, whereas the national-charter bank regulator did not. We use this divergence in policies to examine how the suspension of bank-specific information affected depositors. We find that state-charter banks experienced significantly less deposit outflows than national-charter banks in 1933. However, the behavior of bank deposits across both types of banks converged in 1934 after the introduction of federal deposit insurance.

Keywords: banking crisis; depositor confidence; bank opacity; information management; Great Depression (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 N22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12-01
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Journal Article: Information management in times of crisis (2023)
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