Asset Pledgeability and Endogenously Leveraged Bubbles
Julien Bengui and
Toan Phan ()
No 18-11, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
We develop a simple model of defaultable debt and rational bubbles in the price of an asset, which can be pledged as collateral in a competitive credit pool. When the asset pledgeability is low, the down payment is high, and bubble investment is unleveraged, as in a standard rational bubble model. When the pledgeability is high, the down payment is low, making it easier for leveraged borrowers to invest in the bubbly asset. As loans are packaged together into a competitive pool, the pricing of individual default risk may facilitate risk-taking. In equilibrium, credit-constrained borrowers may optimally choose a risky leveraged investment strategy – borrow to invest in the bubbly asset and default if the bubble bursts. The model predicts joint boom-bust cycles in asset prices and securitized credit.
Keywords: rational bubbles; collateral; credit pool; household debt; equilibrium default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E12 E24 E44 G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-rmg
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Journal Article: Asset pledgeability and endogenously leveraged bubbles (2018)
Working Paper: Asset pledgeability and endogenously leveraged bubbles (2018)
Working Paper: Asset Pledgeability and Endogenously Leveraged Bubbles (2018)
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