Bank management, competition, and interest rates: a portfolio model of discount window activity

William D. Jackson

No 76-01, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond

Abstract: The ability to borrow funds at the discount window is a potentially valuable incentive for a bank to belong to the Federal Reserve System.

Keywords: Bank; management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1976
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