Lending Relationships and Optimal Monetary Policy
Guillaume Rocheteau (),
Russell Wong and
Cathy Zhang ()
No 20-13, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
We construct and calibrate a monetary model of corporate finance with endogenous formation of lending relationships. The equilibrium features money demands by firms that depend on their access to credit and a pecking order of financing means. We describe the mechanism through which monetary policy affects the creation of relationships and firms' incentives to use internal or external finance. We study optimal monetary policy following an unanticipated destruction of relationships under different commitment assumptions. The Ramsey solution uses forward guidance to expedite creation of new relationships by committing to raise the user cost of cash gradually above its long-run value. Absent commitment, the user cost is kept low, delaying recovery.
Keywords: Credit relationships; banks; corporate finance; optimal monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E32 E51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
Note: This revised version: May 2020
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