Bank Competition and Strategic Adaptation to Climate Change
Dasol Kim,
Luke Olson and
Toan Phan
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Luke Olson: https://www.financialresearch.gov/research-staff/details/luke-m-olson/
No 24-06, Working Paper from Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond
Abstract:
How does competition affect banks' adaptation to emergent risks for which there is limited supervisory oversight? The analysis matches detailed supervisory data on home equity lines of credit with high resolution flood projections to identify climate risks. Following Hurricane Harvey, banks updated their internal risk models to better reflect flood risk projections, even in areas unaffected by the disaster. These updates are only detected in banks with exposures to the disaster, indicating heterogeneous bank learning. We use this heterogeneity to identify how bank adaptation is affected by competition. Exposed banks reduce lending to areas with higher flood risks, but only in less competitive markets, suggesting that competition fosters risk-taking over risk mitigation. Additionally, banks are less likely to adapt in markets where competitors are also less likely to do so, suggesting a strategic complementarity in bank adaptation. More broadly, our paper sheds light on the role of competitive forces in how banks manage emerging risks and relevant supervisory challenges.
Keywords: Banks; climate risk; real estate; natural disasters; competition; moral hazard. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D14 E60 G21 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60
Date: 2024-06-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-env and nep-fdg
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