Illegal Immigration, Unemployment, and Multiple Destinations
Kaz Miyagiwa () and
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Kaz Miyagiwa: Department of Economics, Florida International University
No 1804, Working Papers from Florida International University, Department of Economics
We develop a multi-country model of illegal immigration with equilibrium unemployment. Two geographic cases are considered. One has two destinations adjacent to the source country while the other has just one destination country adjacent to it. In both cases, the equilibrium border control proves insufficient compared with the joint optimum, calling for enforcement by federal authorities. Absent such authorities, delegating border control to the country with a larger native labor force can improve each destination country¡¯s welfare. In contrast, the equilibrium internal enforcement policy is efficient, obviating enforcement by supranational authorities.
Keywords: illegal immigration; immigration policy competition; equilibrium unemployment; multiple destinations; job search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 F66 H77 J61 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-mig
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Journal Article: Illegal immigration, unemployment, and multiple destinations (2019)
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