Symmetric majority rules

Daniela Bubboloni () and Michele Gori

No 2014-02, Working Papers - Mathematical Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: In the standard arrovian framework and under the assumption that individual preferences and social outcomes are linear orders on the set of alternatives, we study the rules which satisfy suitable symmetries and obey the majority principle. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives are exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of reversal symmetric majority rules that are anonymous and neutral with respect to the considered partitions. We also determine a general method for constructing and counting those rules and we explicitly apply it to some simple cases.

Keywords: social welfare function; anonymity; neutrality; reversal symmetry; majority; group theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2014-02, Revised 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Journal Article: Symmetric majority rules (2015)
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