Selecting anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric minimal majority rules

Michele Gori

No 2014-04, Working Papers - Mathematical Economics from Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa

Abstract: Assuming that alternatives are three or more, we prove that if the set of anonymous, neutral and reversal symmetric minimal majority rules is nonempty, then it has at least two elements. We propose then further principles linked to equity and fairness that can be used to exclude some rules in that set and we show that, when alternatives are three, suitable combinations of those principles leads to identify a unique rule.

Keywords: Social welfare function; anonymity; neutrality; reversal symmetry; majority; linear order; group theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2014-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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